



USD (AT&L) Better Buying Power Initiative: Target Affordability and Control Cost Growth

Set Shorter Program Timelines and Manage to Them

BBP MA Brief, Module 1.5_27 September 2011

This presentation is to provide an introduction to the Better Buying Power Initiative (BBPi) principal action (Module 1.5) – “Set Shorter Program Timelines and Manage to Them.” The approach to this presentation is that these slides will act as an introduction to this specific principal action. It is also an assumption that this presentation will serve as a starting point for any tailored mission assistance (MA) in support of a specific customer requirement associated with this specific principal action. As such, this introduction should be expected to be supplemented based on the customer’s specific requirement, which can only be determined on a case-by-case basis.



Agenda

- **Why Care?**
- **Better Buying Power (BBP) Initiative**
- **Applicable BBPi Policies**
- **Lessons Learned / Best Practices**
- **References**
- **Summary**






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Fiscal Trends



- Our structural fiscal trajectory is unsustainable
- Our large cyclical deficits are exacerbating debt levels and interest costs
- There are serious shortfalls in public investment in education, infrastructure, research and much else that is critical for longer-term competitiveness, growth, job creation and broad-based income increases in the US
- Everything must be on the table

"This department simply cannot risk continuing down the same path - where our investment priorities, bureaucratic habits and lax attitude towards costs are increasingly divorced from the real threats of today, the growing perils of tomorrow and the nation's grim financial outlook." *SecDef Robert Gates 6 Jan 2011*

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Purpose: This slide's intent is to "set the stage" to create a burning platform as to why the Better Buying Power Initiatives are and have to be implemented.

Bottom-line: US fiscal situation is unsustainable. Despite what politicians are saying Congress will have to increase revenue (by raising taxes) and decrease expenditures (cuts in discretionary spending – including defense) to correct the USA's fiscal situation. SecDef Gates quote in banner of slide says it all...and here is some additional information to back it up:

From CBSA Review of FY12 Budget: When measured as a fraction of overall federal government spending, defense spending has ranged between 16 percent and 29 percent since FY 1976, averaging 21 percent of the federal budget. In the FY 2012 budget request, defense spending is 19 percent of the overall budget, compared to 21 percent for social security and 13 percent for



Medicare—the other major components of the federal budget, collectively known as the "big three." In the coming years, however, the costs of Social Security, Medicare, and net interest on the national debt are expected to grow faster than the defense budget, making defense a relatively smaller share of the budget over time.

In 2010, the three major entitlement programs—Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security—accounted for 44 percent of non-interest Federal spending, up from 30 percent in 1980. By 2035,

when the surviving baby boomers will all be 70 or older, these three programs could account for more than 60 percent of non-interest Federal spending...leaving little for defense.



Fiscal Trends on Defense Spending



- The FY11 base defense budget was 1.1% less than FY10 base budget and 3.5% less than the President requested
- DoD's Cum base budget over the FY12 FYDP is \$78B less (TY \$) than planned in FY11 FYDP – a 2.6% reduction
- RDT&E funding is declining – by 2016 it will 25% than 2009

- The "Budget Control Act of 2011" called for \$450 billion in cuts to defense spending over 10 years in 1st stage
- Stage 2 of the Act required The Congressional Super Committee (stage 2) to identify \$1.2 trillion in federal budget savings by 2021. Failure to do so means DoD faces an additional ~\$600B in cuts (stage 3) to its budget over the next 10 years

DoD may not have an opportunity to recapitalize its inventory of equipment for a decade or longer given the fiscal constraints the nation now faces. We must **focus on cutting and controlling costs in order to get the systems we need and sustain the ones we have.**

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Stage Setter – This chart is to answer the PM's question: "Why should I be concerned about this?" Bottom line: DoD Budgets are at risk and DoD leadership will likely have to cut programs – and one of the programs cut may be their's!

Budget Control Act Information:

As the debt ceiling deal was reached in early August, congressional leaders came to an 11th-hour compromise that would allow the government to continue to borrow money, but also provide first steps and a roadmap for reducing the deficit. This agreement, the Budget Control Act, increased the debt ceiling based on three important provisions to reduce growth in the national debt. The first provision was a set of discretionary spending caps, which limit defense and nondefense spending for the next 10 years (through 2021). These spending caps reduce the Department of Defense (DoD) budget over the 10-year period by approximately \$450 billion, a 7 percent decrease. These caps are now in place and the FY 2013 budget proposal will reflect them early next year. The second provision created a bipartisan Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction, the "Super Committee," tasked with finding at least \$1.2 trillion in savings through 2021. To force action, the third provision set up a fail-safe mechanism called sequestration. These automatic cuts take effect only after the Super Committee failed to reach an agreement on deficit reduction by the November 23 deadline. The deadline for the Super Committee to present a plan to Congress came and went without a single dollar of deficit reduction coming from the committee, officially triggering the sequestration process.

Q2: What does sequestration mean for the Department of Defense?

A2: The sequestration process created by the Budget Control Act initiates automatic spending cuts equal to the \$1.2 trillion of savings required of the Super Committee. These cuts are split equally between defense and nondefense spending and go into effect January 2, 2013. This has led to public statements of \$600 billion in defense cuts, but since money cut from the budget substantially lowers the government's interest payments, the actual amount that would be cut from the defense budget is \$492 billion from 2013 to 2021, evenly divided at about \$55 billion per year. The total reduction in the defense budget over 10 years, including the \$450 billion in Budget Control Act *caps*, the \$492 billion in sequestration *cuts*, and additional cuts of about \$39 billion allocated by the White House, add up to a total reduction of about \$980 billion. While this is certainly a lot of money, it represents approximately a 15 percent reduction below the baseline 10-year budget provided by the Congressional Budget Office. It is also important to note that war funding for Iraq and Afghanistan provided through the Overseas Contingency Operations appropriations is exempt from the caps and cuts listed above. SOURCE: [http://csis.org/publication/super-committee-fallout-and-implications-defense]



The Imperative



“We can no longer afford to spend as if deficits don’t matter and waste is not our problem.”



“To sustain necessary investment levels . . . we must significantly improve the effectiveness and efficiency of our business operations. Doing so will increase funding . . . For our mission functions from savings in overhead, support, and non-mission areas.”



“We must therefore strive to achieve what economists call productivity growth: in simple terms, to DO MORE WITHOUT MORE

Purpose: Provide quotes from leadership on why acquisition personnel should embrace the BBPI.



“Do More Without More”

“...I am seeking to restore affordability and productivity through initiatives in the following five areas: (1) Targeting Affordability and Controlling Cost Growth; (2) Incentivizing Productivity and Innovation in Industry; (3) Promoting Real Competition; (4) Improving Tradecraft in Services Acquisition, and; (5) Reducing Non-Productive Processes and Bureaucracy.”

“...the efficiencies...can make a significant contribution to achieving the **\$100 billion redirection of defense budget dollars from unproductive to more productive purposes.**”

“To put it bluntly: we have a continuing responsibility to procure the critical goods and services our forces need in the years ahead, but we will not have ever-increasing budgets to pay for them. **We must therefore strive to...DO MORE WITHOUT MORE.**”

Remarks from Undersecretary ATL Ashton Carter Sept 14, 2010 Memo “Better Buying Power”



Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics

We must reassess our business practices to manage defense dollars in a more efficient manner

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

Purpose: To show guidance from AT&L.

Affordability can be defined as the degree to which the life-cycle cost of an acquisition program is in consonance with the long-range modernization, force structure, and manpower plans of the individual DoD Components, as well as for the Department as a whole [DAG]



Disturbing Trends

- **Schedule Delays**
- **Decline of economy**
- **Budget Overruns**



Source: Deloitte A&D Study, "Can we afford our own future?", December 2008

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
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Purpose: To show recent trends that MDAPs have shown historical tendencies towards schedule delays (~67% of programs late/behind original schedule) and budget overruns (estimated extrapolation indicating >40% budget overruns compared to original baseline.)



GAO Reporting



- **Overall DoD assessment**
 - Two-page assessment on individual programs
- **Latest reviewed 98 MDAPs**
- **Total acquisition cost is \$60B increase over last 2 years**
- **50% do not meet performance goals**
- **80% experienced increase in unit costs from initial estimates**

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Purpose: Government Accountability Office (GAO) has been doing annual reporting that basically mirrors the study results shown on the previous slide. Since GAO reports to Congress (amongst others), the historical trends of the last slide in addition to these types of GAO findings tend to draw increased scrutiny and attention to programs and program offices.



DoD Leadership Perceptions

- **Discovered there were programs that did not manage to timelines**
- **Increase in timelines result in:**
 - Substantial cost growth
 - Late delivery to Warfighter
- **Because of increased timelines, technology is passing programs by**
 - Programs delivering outdated technology/ capability

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“On program schedules, think of it like a NASA program planetary probe that has to rendezvous with the planet in 2017; if you don’t make that date you have to wait another 50,000 years.” D, to PMT 402, 17 Nov 10.

“For the GCV, the Army has taken the approach that they want a vehicle produced in 7 years and you get whatever can be produced by that time.” D to PMT 402, 17 Nov 10.

“I’d like to live in a world where you come forward for a MS decision, get the decision and come back in four years for your next MS.” E to PMT 402, 11 Feb 11.

Highlighted the two items under still needs to be done in that, there needs to be greater alignment between the Requirements Community and the Acquisition Community to reduce changes/creep which result in schedule disruptions and extensions.

Discipline in the use of M&S, Technology Insertion, Technology Readiness Assessments, and Manufacturing Readiness Assessments will reduce schedule risks and identify opportunities for schedule compression. Implementation and application of the new Sustainment Maturity Levels will do the same relative to readiness for supportability.

Discipline in the use of process improvement practices will also allow for mitigation of schedule risks and identification of schedule compression opportunities. This includes CMMI, AIRSpeed, Lean/Six Sigma, CPI, TOC and other methodologies. Particularly those methodologies that look to reduce cycle time (i.e. Lean) will benefit the PM when it comes to reducing and managing program timelines.



But it is Possible...

- **Army Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV)**
 - Initial acquisition plan called for 10 years to first production
 - Not atypical pace (unfortunately)
 - Large investment of GV technology already completed as part of cancelled Future Combat Systems (FCS) program
 - So question became: Why still need 10 years to develop GCV?
 - Limit requirements to those essential to infantry fighting vehicle
 - Incorporate lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan
 - **Department determined 7-year schedule sufficient**
 - Requirements and technology to this first block would need to fit 7-year schedule...not other way around

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Purpose: Just one example of a program that was able to “get it done.” Shows that most MDAPs are not doomed to incur cost overruns and/or schedule delays that endanger program success.



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Purpose: This next section provides an overview of the Better Buying Power Initiative (BBPi). This section attempts to provide BBPi background frame of reference so audiences have a common baseline understanding for the BBPi prior to the start of any MA effort.



Guidance Roadmap

Target Affordability and Control Cost Growth <ul style="list-style-type: none">Mandate affordability as a requirementImplement "should cost" based management<ul style="list-style-type: none">* ARA memo 12 Dec 2011 – Should-Cost Templates* AT&L memo 24 Aug 2011 – Should-Cost and Affordability* AT&L memo 22 Apr 2011 – Will Cost/Should Cost* USA SAAL_ZR memo 10 June – Army Implementation of USD (AT&L Affordability Initiatives* USAF memo 15 June 2011 – Implementation of Will-Cost and Should Cost Management* SECNAV ASN-RDA memo 19 July 2011 – Implementation of Should Cost ManagementEliminate redundancy within warfighter portfoliosAchieve Stable and economical production ratesManage program timelines	Promote Real Competition <ul style="list-style-type: none">Emphasize competitive strategy at each program milestoneRemove obstacles to competition<ul style="list-style-type: none">Allow reasonable time to bid* DPAP memo 27 April 2011/24 Nov 2010 – Improving CompetitionRequire non-certified cost and pricing data on single offersEnforce open system architectures and set rules for acquisition of technical data rightsIncrease small business role and opportunities* DPAP memo 14 Jul y 2011 Use Government –wide Acquisition Contracts Set Aside Exclusively for Small Business* DPAP memo 27 June 2011 Increase Dynamic Business Roles in the Defense Marketplace
Incentivize Productivity & Innovation in Industry <ul style="list-style-type: none">Reward contractors for successful supply chain and indirect expense managementIncrease Use of FPIF contract typeCapitalize on progress payment structures<ul style="list-style-type: none">* DPAP memo 27 April 2011 – Cash Flow ModelsInstitute a superior supplier incentive programReinvigorate industry's independent research and development	Improve Tradecraft in Acquisition of Services <ul style="list-style-type: none">Assign senior managers for acquisition of services<ul style="list-style-type: none">* Senior Manager's appointed similar to AF PEO (Army Nov 2010/Navy Jun 2011)Adopt uniform services market segmentation (taxonomy)* DPAP memo 23 Nov 2010 – Taxonomy for Acquisition of ServicesAddress causes of poor tradecraft<ul style="list-style-type: none">Define requirements and prevent creepConduct market researchIncrease small business participation<ul style="list-style-type: none">* DPAP memo 14 Jul y 2011 Use Government –wide Acquisition Contracts Set Aside Exclusively for Small Business
Reduce Non-Productive Processes and Bureaucracy <ul style="list-style-type: none">* PDUSD AT&L memo 14 Sept 2011 – Document Streamlining-Life-cycle Sustainment Plan* PDUSD AT&L memo 10 July 2011 – Document Streamlining-Program Protection Plan* PDUSD AT&L memo 23 June 2011 – Improving Milestone Process Effectiveness* PDUSD AT&L memo 20 April 2011 – Document Streamlining-Program Strategies and SEPReduce frequency of OSD level reviews<ul style="list-style-type: none">* AT&L memo 11 May 2011 – Improving Technology Readiness Assessment EffectivenessWork with Congress to eliminate low value added statutory requirementsReduce the volume and cost of Congressional ReportsReduce non-value added requirements imposed on industryAlign DCMA and DCAA processes to ensure work is complementary<ul style="list-style-type: none">* DPAP memo 4 Jan 2010 – Align DCMA and DCAAIncrease use of Forward Pricing Rate Recommendations (FRRs) to reduce administrative costs<ul style="list-style-type: none">* DPAP memo 4 Jan 2010 – Align DCMA and DCAA	Related Memos/DTMs: <ul style="list-style-type: none">* AT&L memo 8 Dec 2011– Value Engineering (VE) and Obtaining greater Efficiency & Productivity in Defense Spending* PDUSD AT&L memo 19 July 2011– Roles & Responsibilities of the OSD OIPT Leaders, Teams and Team members* AT&L memo 23 June 2011– DTM 11-009 – Acquisition Policy for Defense Business Systems* AT&L memo 21 March 2011– DTM 11-003 – Reliability Analysis, Planning, Tracking and Reporting* PDUSD AT&L memo 24 Feb 2011– Expected Business Practice: Post Critical Design Review Reports and Assessments* OMB memo 2 Feb 2011 – "Myth Busting", Addressing Misconceptions to Improve Communications with Industry during the Acquisition Process

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Purpose: Provides a snapshot (as of 10 January 2012) regarding five "major areas" that include 23 "principal actions." Within some principal actions are specific AT&L or other DoD agency policy memorandums/guidance documents that have been published to date. These policy memorandums/guidance documents are limited in number and are listed under the main principal action for which the document applies. However, many of these memorandums/guidance documents overlap and support other principal actions. For this briefing, it can be noted that there have not been any specific policy memorandums/guidance documents yet written for the "Set Shorter Program Timelines and Manage to Them." Therefore, this briefing will draw from other principal area policy memorandums/guidance documents that can be viewed as having an impact to the "Set Shorter Program Timelines and Manage to Them" principal action – the object of this briefing.



Dr. Carter Memo for Acquisition Professionals – September 14, 2010

SUBJECT: Better Buying Power: Guidance for Obtaining Greater Efficiency and Productivity in Defense Spending

TARGET AFFORDABILITY AND CONTROL COST GROWTH

“Set Shorter Program Timelines and Manage to Them”

- As all programs compete for funding, the usual result is that a program settles into a level-of-effort pattern of annual funding that does not deviate much from year to year. The total program cost is the level-of-effort times the length of the program.
- Yet managers who run into a problem in program execution generally cannot easily compromise requirements and face an uphill battle to obtain more than their budgeted level of funding. The frequent result is a stretch in the schedule.

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Purpose: Identifies text within AT&L's major policy 14 September 2010 memorandum that addresses principal action topic of shorter program timelines.



Dr. Carter Memo for Acquisition Professionals – September 14, 2010

SUBJECT: Better Buying Power: Guidance for Obtaining Greater Efficiency and Productivity in Defense Spending

TARGET AFFORDABILITY AND CONTROL COST GROWTH

“Set Shorter Program Timelines and Manage to Them”

- When requirements and proposed schedules are inconsistent, I will work...to modify requirements as needed before granting authority for the program to proceed. I will not grant authority to release requests for proposals until I am confident requirements and proposed schedules are consistent.
- Also require as part of cost tradeoff analysis at Milestone B to support affordability, a justification for the proposed program schedule. This justification will be part of the ADM authorizing the program to proceed. Deviation from that schedule without my prior approval will lead to revocation of the Milestone.

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Purpose: Identifies text within AT&L's major policy 14 September 2010 memorandum that addresses principal action topic of shorter program timelines.



Dr. Carter Implementation Directive – November 3, 2010



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2014

NOV 03 2010

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES

SUBJECT: Implementation Directive for Better Buying Power – Obtaining Greater Efficiency and Productivity in Defense Spending

As detailed in my September 14, 2010 Guidance to acquisition professionals, I am seeking to obtain greater efficiency and productivity in defense spending by pursuing initiatives in the following five areas: (1) Target Affordability and Control Cost Growth; (2) Incentivize Productivity and Innovation in Industry; (3) Promote Real Competition; (4) Improve Tradeoffs in Service, Acquisition, and (5) Reduce Non-Productive Processes and Bureaucracy.

This memorandum was prepared for publication. DoD & network users are encouraged to utilize the following URL:

Set shorter program timelines and manage to them:

Effective November 15, 2010, you will include a justification for the proposed program schedule as part of the cost tradeoff analysis at MS B to support affordability. This justification will be part of the ADM authorizing the program to proceed. Deviation from the schedule established at the most recent MS without my prior approval could lead to revocation of the MS.

Programs are managed in accordance with the guidance provided in the memorandum. This analysis should show results of capability requirements around expected design performance points to highlight elements that can be used to establish cost and schedule trade space. The affordability target should be presented in the context of an analysis of the resources that are projected to be available in the portfolio or mission area(s) associated with the program being considered for the MS A decision, assuming programed defense budgets and force structures. In order to meet this requirement, you will provide a quantitative analysis of the program's portfolio or mission area across the life cycle of all products in the portfolio or mission area, including acquisition and operating and support budget suitability to absorb the proposed new start as a system change. Specifically, if introducing a new program into a portfolio or mission area, you should indicate what specific adjustments will be made to absorb the new program.

<https://acc.dau.mil/adl/en-US/434888/file/56520/Memo%20for%20Services%20and%20Agencies.pdf>

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Purpose: Identifies text within AT&L's major policy 3 November 2010 memorandum that addresses topic of shorter program timelines.



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Purpose: This section highlights several AT&L and other DoD agency policy documents/memorandums that – while not specifically written for the “Set Shorter Program Timelines” principal action – do have applicability to this principal action.




No Specific Guidance, but...

- No policy yet established that specifically addresses “program timelines”
- However, program timelines (i.e., schedule) is intimately intertwined across all aspects of BBP
 - Does not stand-alone
 - Addressed as a factor associated with other BBP policies

Purpose: This section highlights several AT&L and other DoD agency policy documents/memorandums that – while not specifically written for the “Set Shorter Program Timelines” principal action – do have applicability to this principal action.



DAB A & B Schedule Templates




Is the schedule justifiable? Is the schedule affordable?

Purpose: Illustrates that schedule templates (i.e., program “timelines”) are formal part of DAB A and DAB B presentations. Hence, program timelines/schedules are critical aspect of program concern.



Improve Milestone Effectiveness



- **Current review process**
 - MDA does not have enough time to review program plans prior to final RFP release
- **New review process**
 - MDA conducts Milestone A and Pre-EMD Reviews before final RFP release
 - Milestone B approval before EMD phase contract award
 - Milestone C precedes P&D phase contract award
 - Peer Review prior to any final RFP release
- **Goal**
 - Better align contracting activities
 - Reduce program timelines and potential disruptions

<https://dap.dau.mil/policy/Lists/Policy%20Documents/Attachments/3293/20110623-ImproveMilestoneProcess.pdf>

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
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Purpose: Highlights 23 June 2011 policy document (Improving Milestone Process Effectiveness) that discusses major milestone (i.e., program schedule) objectives.



Improve Milestone Effectiveness



<https://dap.dau.mil/policy/Lists/Policy%20Documents/Attachments/3293/20110623-ImproveMilestoneProcess.pdf>

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Purpose: Figure from 23 June 2011 policy document (Improving Milestone Process Effectiveness) that illustrates areas of milestone process that can be targeted for program schedule impacts.



Technology Readiness Assessment



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1615 DEFENSE PENNSYLVANIA
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

MAY 11 2011

MEMORANDUM FOR COMPONENT ACQUISITION EXECUTIVES

SUBJECT: Improving Technology Readiness Assessment Effectiveness

As I noted in my "Better Buying Power" memorandum last year, the process for conducting Technology Readiness Assessments (TRAs) has strayed from its original intent and should be reformed. TRAs should focus only on technology maturity, as opposed to engineering and integration risk, and the responsibility for ensuring that technology maturity risk is adequately identified and mitigated should rest with the Program Manager (PM), Program Executive Officer, and Component Acquisition Executive, subject to ASD&RA's review.

New instructions for conducting TRAs are contained in updated "TRA Guidance" (<http://www.dau.mil/policy/publications/docs/TRA2011.pdf>). Some of the significant changes from prior TRA procedures are as follows:

- A TRA is required for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) at Milestone (MS) B for a subsequent milestone (if there is no MS B) to support the independent review and assessment by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (ASD&RA). The ASD&RA will determine whether the technology of the program has been demonstrated in a relevant environment to support the MS Decision Authority (MDA)'s certification under 10 U.S.C. § 2366b. TRAs for the ASD&RA are not required for Major Automated Information System programs, non-MDAPs, or MDAP MS C decisions, except for MDAPs entering the acquisition system at MS C. However, MDAs for all programs are required to ensure that technology risk has been reduced to acceptable levels prior to entering engineering development or design for production. Acquisition Category II-IV programs should conduct TRAs in accordance with relevant Component direction by following the "TRA Guidance" as appropriate.
- A TRA will be conducted and reported by the PM who will select a team of subject matter experts to assist in conducting the TRA. The PM will align the process by which critical technologies are identified and evidence of technology maturity is acquired with the program's schedule and resources.
- A preliminary version of the TRA final report will be presented at the pre-MS B MDA Review prior to RFP release for the EMD phase.
- The PM will submit a TRA final report through the appropriate Component Acquisition Executive to the ASD&RA who will evaluate the report as part of the basis upon which the ASD&RA will make recommendations to the MDA. Based on the advice of the ASD&RA, the MDA will determine whether to certify technology

- TRA process has strayed
 - Focus only on technical maturity
 - Do not focus on engineering and integration risk
- "PM will align the process by which critical technologies are identified and evidence of technical maturity is acquired with the *program's schedule and resources.*"
- Allows early/ clearer identification of technology maturity issues/ readiness providing for better schedule planning and management

<https://dap.dau.mil/policy/Lists/Policy%20Documents/Attachments/3291/20110511-ImprovingTRAEffect.pdf>

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
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Purpose: Technology Readiness Assessment (TRAs) are major Systems Engineering-based focus that can help ensure program timelines are actionable and reasonable. Allowing programs to proceed through the acquisition process with insufficiently advanced technology levels were a major concern for the December 2008 rewrite of DoDI 5000.02. A more rigid systems engineering process was implemented with the new DoDI 5000.02 and one aspect that accompanied this emphasis on systems engineering was an adherence to TRA levels. In fact, while not specifically a regulatory mandate, programs are now "expected" to illustrate a TRA level of 6 at Milestone B.



TRA Guidance



- **Systematic, metrics-based process**
- **Assesses maturity and associated risks with “critical” technologies**
 - Particularly during EMD phase
- **Need to be supplemented with expert professional judgment**
- **Required for MDAPs at Milestone B**
- **MDAs for non-ACAT 1 programs should consider requiring TRAs when technological risk is present**

<http://www.acq.osd.mil/ddre/publications/docs/TRA2011.pdf>

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Purpose: Note that TRAs need to be treated as a scheduled task within a program’s master schedule. Reaching a TRA decision is not a single-point accomplishment and requires time for analysis...as much as 12 months or more. Planning is integral to reaching a meaningful TRA decision.



TRLs Defined

TRL	Definition	Description	Supporting Information
1	Basic principles observed and reported.	Lowest level of technology readiness. Scientific research begins to be translated into applied research and development (R&D). Examples might include paper studies of a technology's basic properties.	Published research that identifies the principles that underlie this technology. References to who, where, when.
2	Technology concept and/or application formulated.	Invention begins. Once basic principles are observed, practical applications can be invented. Applications are speculative, and there may be no proof or detailed analysis to support the assumptions. Examples are limited to analytic studies.	Publications or other references that outline the application being considered and that provide analysis to support the concept.
3	Analytical and experimental/operational function and/or characteristic proof of concept.	Active R&D is initiated. This includes analytical studies and laboratory studies to physically validate the analytical predictions of separate elements of the technology. Examples include components that are not yet integrated or representative.	Results of laboratory tests performed to measure parameters of interest and comparison to analytical predictions for critical subsystems. References to who, where, and when these tests and comparisons were performed.
4	Component and/or breadboard validation in a laboratory environment.	Basic technological components are integrated to establish that they will work together. This is relatively "low fidelity" compared with the eventual system. Examples include integration of "off the shelf" hardware in the laboratory.	System concepts that have been considered and results from testing laboratory-scale breadboards. References to who did this work and when. Provide an estimate of how breadboard hardware and test results differ from the expected system goals.
5	Component and/or breadboard validation in a relevant environment.	Fidelity of breadboard technology increases significantly. The basic technological components are integrated with reasonably realistic supporting elements so they can be tested in a simulated environment. Examples include "high-fidelity" laboratory integration of components.	Results from testing laboratory breadboard system are integrated with other supporting elements in a simulated operational environment. How does the "relevant environment" differ from the expected operational environment? How do the test results compare with expectations? What problems, if any, were encountered? Was the breadboard system refined to more closely match the expected system goals?
6	System/subsystem model or prototype demonstration in a relevant environment.	Representative model or prototype system, which is well beyond that of TRL 5, is tested in a relevant environment. Represents a major step up in a technology's demonstrated readiness. Examples include testing a prototype in a high-fidelity	Results from laboratory testing of a prototype system that is near the desired configuration in terms of performance, weight, and volume. How did the test environment differ from the operational environment? Who performed the tests? How did the test compare with expectations? What problems, if any, were encountered? What are/were the plans, options, or


TRL	Definition	Description	Supporting Information
7	System prototype demonstration in an operational environment.	Prototype near or at planned operational system. Represents a major step up from TRL 6 by requiring demonstration of an actual system prototype in an operational environment (e.g., in an aircraft, in a vehicle, or in space).	Results from testing a prototype system in an operational environment. Who performed the tests? How did the test compare with expectations? What problems, if any, were encountered? What are/were the plans, options, or actions to resolve problems before moving to the next level?
8	Actual system completed and qualified through test and demonstration.	Technology has been proven to work in its final form and under expected conditions. In almost all cases, this TRL encompasses the end of true system development. Examples include developmental test and evaluation (DT&E) of the system in its intended weapon system to determine if it meets design specifications.	Results of testing the system in its final configuration under the expected range of environmental conditions in which it will be expected to operate. Assessment of whether it will meet its operational requirements. What problems, if any, were encountered? What are/were the plans, options, or actions to resolve problems before finalizing the design?
9	Actual system proven through successful mission operations.	Actual application of the technology in its final form and under mission conditions, such as those encountered in operational test and evaluation (OT&E). Examples include using the system under operational mission conditions.	OT&E reports.

- Adequate demonstration of technology in relevant environment
 - Defined as TRL level 6
 - Typically default level for successful Milestone B

<http://www.acq.osd.mil/ddre/publications/docs/TRA2011.pdf>



Manufacturing Readiness Level



- MRLs and assessments of manufacturing readiness designed to manage manufacturing risk
- Create measurement scale and vocabulary to assess manufacturing maturity and risk
- Manufacturing analysis to:
 - Define current level of manufacturing maturity
 - Identify maturity shortfalls, costs, and risks
 - Provide basis for manufacturing maturation and risk management
- Document contains best practices to conduct assessments for manufacturing readiness

http://www.dodmrl.com/MRL_Deskbook_v1.pdf

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Purpose: Manufacturing Readiness Levels (MRLs) are major Systems Engineering-based focus that can help ensure program timelines are actionable and reasonable. A more rigid systems engineering process was implemented with the new DoDI 5000.02 and one aspect that accompanied this emphasis on systems engineering was an adherence to MRLs.



Assessing Manufacturing Risk

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office
Report to Congressional Requesters

April 2010

BEST PRACTICES

DOD Can Achieve
Better Outcomes by
Standardizing the Way
Manufacturing Risks
Are Managed



GAO-10-439

<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10439.pdf>

- **GAO recommended DoD standardize the appraisal of manufacturing risk**
 - TRAs are understood
 - Manufacturing Risk Assessments are industry best practice
 - MRLs and TRLs used together can address two key areas
 - Immature product technologies
 - Immature manufacturing capability
 - Actual and target MRLs compared to form manufacturing maturation plan
- **National Defense Authorization Act of 2011 recommends SECDEF issue comprehensive guidance on management of manufacturing risk**


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
TRL and MRL Relationship



Purpose: Show the relationship between TRLs and MRLs. Note relationship is not “one-for-one.”



Document Streamlining: TDS/AS



[https://acc.dau.mil/adl/en-US/441472/file/57009/PDUSD\(ATL\)%20Memo%20TDS-AS%20SEP%2020Apr11.pdf](https://acc.dau.mil/adl/en-US/441472/file/57009/PDUSD(ATL)%20Memo%20TDS-AS%20SEP%2020Apr11.pdf)

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- **Concern with growth and content of acquisition documentation**
 - “... principal concern...was that page count had substantially increased, but necessary and important content was still not included.”
- **Task force comprehensive review**
- **Initial recommendations:**
 - TDS/AS streamlined
 - LCSP separated from AS and being revised
 - CAE now ACAT I delegated authority for:
 - Corrosion Protection Plan
 - PESHE
 - IUID Implementation Plan

Purpose: Illustrate that document streamlining is major aspect of BBPI. Helps assist with “shortening program timelines” because document approval process can be huge investment of resources. Attempt with this policy document is to ensure that major acquisition documents are streamlined to greatest extent possible so that decision-makers can focus on just the facts...and reach a more timely decision, which will help with shortening program timelines. These next few slides address four of the primary documents that have approved streamlining formats: Technology Demonstration Strategy (TDS), Acquisition Strategy (AS), Systems Engineering Plan (SEP), and Life Cycle Sustainment Plan (LCSP).



Document Streamlining: TDS / AS

Classification/Distribution Statement, as required

TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
[or]
ACQUISITION STRATEGY
FOR
[PROGRAM NAME]

[Sample Outline]

20 April 2011

Version 1.0, 04090911

- Purpose
- Capability Need
- Acquisition Approach
- Tailoring
- Program Schedule
- Risk and Risk Management
- Business Strategy
- Cost and Funding
- Resource Management
- International Involvement
- Industrial Capability and Manufacturing Readiness
- Life-Cycle Signature Support
- Military Equipment Valuation

[https://acc.dau.mil/adl/en-US/441472/file/57009/PDUSD\(ATL\)%20Memo%20TDS-AS%20SEP%2020Apr11.pdf](https://acc.dau.mil/adl/en-US/441472/file/57009/PDUSD(ATL)%20Memo%20TDS-AS%20SEP%2020Apr11.pdf)

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Classification/Distribution Statement, as required

TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
[or]
ACQUISITION STRATEGY
FOR
[PROGRAM NAME]

[Sample Outline]

20 April 2011

Version 1.0, 04090911


Section 5.0 – Program Schedule

- 5.1 Detailed graphic (see DAB templates)
- 5.2 Indicate basis for establishing delivery or performance-period requirements
- 5.3 Summarize analysis justifying proposed program schedule
- 5.4 Discuss activities planned for phase following the milestone
- 5.5 Specify programmatic interdependencies with other programs
- 5.6 If evolutionary, state relationship of milestones/activities between increments

[https://acc.dau.mil/adl/en-US/441472/file/57009/PDUSD\(ATL\)%20Memo%20TDS-AS%20SEP%2020Apr11.pdf](https://acc.dau.mil/adl/en-US/441472/file/57009/PDUSD(ATL)%20Memo%20TDS-AS%20SEP%2020Apr11.pdf)



Document Streamlining: SEP



- Introduction – Purpose and Update Plan
- Program Technical Requirements
- Engineering Resources and Management
- Technical Activities and Products

- Annex A – Acronyms

- Tables and Figures (mandated)

[https://acc.dau.mil/adl/en-US/441472/file/57009/PDUSD\(ATL\)%20Memo%20TDS-AS%20SEP%2020Apr11.pdf](https://acc.dau.mil/adl/en-US/441472/file/57009/PDUSD(ATL)%20Memo%20TDS-AS%20SEP%2020Apr11.pdf)

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Document Streamlining: SEP

MANDATED FORMAT FOR ALL
SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PLANS

PROGRAM NAME – ACAT LEVEL
SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PLAN
VERSION ____

SUPPORTING MILESTONE _
AND
[APPROPRIATE PHASE NAME]
[DATE]

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (OSD) APPROVAL

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
Systems Engineering
(for MDAFs and MAAS Programs)
[or designated SEP approval authority]

Date _____

OPR: ODA&D (Systems Engineering) SEP/Rev/02

Section 3 – Engineering Resources and Management

- 3.1 Technical Schedule and Schedule Risk Assessment (see DAB templates)
 - Technical schedule
 - Planned milestones
- 3.2 Engineering Resources and Cost/ Schedule Reporting
- 3.3 Engineering and Integration Risk Management
- 3.4 Technical Organization
- 3.5 Relationships with External Technical Organizations
- 3.6 Technical Performance Measures and Metrics

[https://acc.dau.mil/adl/en-US/441472/file/57009/PDUSD\(ATL\)%20Memo%20TDS-AS%20SEP%2020Apr11.pdf](https://acc.dau.mil/adl/en-US/441472/file/57009/PDUSD(ATL)%20Memo%20TDS-AS%20SEP%2020Apr11.pdf)

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Document Streamlining: LCSP



PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
361A DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3414

SEP 14 2011

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES

SUBJECT: Document Streamlining - Life Cycle Sustainment Plan (LCSP)

Reference: (a) USNDA/TAL1 memorandum, "Better Buying Power: Guidance for Obtaining Greater Efficiency and Productivity in Defense Sustainment," September 14, 2010
(b) PDS/NDAT&L1 memorandum, "Document Streamlining - Program Strategies and Systems Engineering Plan," April 20, 2011
(c) PDS/NDAT&L1 memorandum, "Document Streamlining - Program Production Plan," July 18, 2011

Reference (a) directed a review of the documentation required by DoD 5000.02 in support of the acquisition process. This is the third in a series of document streamlining memoranda, following references (b) and (c). I am directing the following actions for the LCSP:

Document Streamlining: The LCSP will be streamlined consistent with the attached annotated outline. The outline is designed to be a tool for programs to effectively and affordably satisfy life-cycle sustainment requirements. This plan articulates the product support strategy, and it must be kept relevant as the program evolves through the acquisition milestones and into sustainment. The LCSP outline emphasizes early-phase sustainment requirements development and planning, focuses on cross-functional integration - most critically with systems engineering - and highlights key sustainment contract development and management activities.

LCSP Review and Approval: Per reference (b), the LCSP has been separated from the Acquisition Strategy. Every acquisition program shall develop a LCSP. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Material Readiness (ASD/L&MR) shall approve LCSPs for all ACAT ID and USNDA/TAL1-designated special interest programs for Milestone A or equivalent, such subsequent milestones, and Full-Rate Production decisions. Following the system's initial operating capability, the component acquisition executive (CAE) or delegate shall approve LCSP updates, in coordination with the ASD/L&MR. Approval for ACAT IC and below LCSPs is delegated to the CAE or Component designer.

These actions constitute expected business practice and are effective immediately. The revised outline will be documented in the Defense Acquisition Guidebook and referenced in the

- Emphasizes early-phase sustainment development requirements and planning
- Focuses on cross-functional integration...most critically with SEP
- Highlights key sustainment contract development/ management activities
- Integrated Schedule expectation:
 - Expand program's IMS and SEP in area of product support
 - Focus on areas that drive budget
 - Support/test equipment, trainers, etc
 - Capture major activities the PSM required to develop and implement the PSP

https://dap.dau.mil/policy/Lists/Policy%20Documents/Attachments/3303/USA005157-11_SignedLCSPMemo_14Sep2011.pdf

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Document Streamlining: LCSP

MANDATED FORMAT FOR ALL
LIFE-CYCLE SUSTAINMENT PLANS

PROGRAM NAME - ACAT LEVEL

LIFE-CYCLE SUSTAINMENT PLAN
VERSION ____

SUPPORTING MILESTONE _
AND
[APPROPRIATE PHASE NAME]

[DATE]

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (OSD) APPROVAL

Date

Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Logistics & Materiel Readiness)

- Purpose
- Product Support Performance
- Product Support Strategy
- Product Support Arrangement
- Product Support Package Status
- Regulatory/Statutory Requirements that Influence Sustainment Support
- Integrated Schedule
- Funding
- Management
- Supportability Analysis
- Additional Sustainment Planning Factors

https://dap.dau.mil/policy/Lists/Policy%20Documents/Attachments/3303/USA005157-11_SignedLCSPMemo_14Sep2011.pdf

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Post-CDR Reports and Assessments



PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3015 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3015

FEB 24 2011

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES

SUBJECT: Expected Business Practice: Post-Critical Design Review Reports and Assessments

Consistent with the Department of Defense's (DoD) intent to obtain greater efficiency and productivity in defense acquisition, I am eliminating the Program Manager's (PM) reporting responsibility for the Post-Critical Design Review (CDR) Report currently required by DoD Instruction 5000.02, Enclosure 2, para 6.4.5(9)(3)(1). The Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Engineering) (DASD(SE)) will participate in program CDRs and prepare a brief assessment of the program's design maturity and technical risks which may require Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) attention. Consequently, PMs of Major Defense Acquisition Programs shall be required to invite DASD(SE) engineers to their system-level CDRs and make available CDR artifacts. The draft CDR assessments will be coordinated with the PM prior to forwarding to the MDA. PMs shall continue to document CDRs in accordance with component best practices.

This procedural change is effective immediately and constitutes expected business practice. It will be documented in the Defense Acquisition Guidebook and institutionalized in the next update to DoD 5000.02. I encourage Component MDAs to consider similar assignment of CDR reporting responsibility for acquisition programs under their cognizance.

Frank Kendall
Principal Deputy

cc:
All CDRs
DCMA
DCAA
DCMO
DASD(PSA)

- "...eliminating the PM reporting responsibility for the Post-CDR Report..."
- DASD(SE) will:
 - Participate in program CDRs
 - Prepare assessment of program's design maturity and technical risks
- PMs of MDAPs required to invite DASD(SE) engineers to system-level CDRs
- Draft assessments coordinated with PM before sent to MDA

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Agenda

- *Why Care?*
- *Better Buying Power (BBP) Initiative*
- *Applicable BBPi Policies*
- **Lessons Learned / Best Practices**
- *References*
- *Summary*

Purpose: This introduction is intended to provide an introduction to Lessons Learned/ Best Practices applicable to the “Set Shorter Program Timelines and Manage to Them” principal action area. The identified Lessons Learned/ Best Practices within this section are NOT intended to be comprehensive but, rather, a starting point. Based on the customer’s specific requirements, the addressed Lessons Learned/ Best Practices can be changed, modified, or expanded.



Lessons Learned / Best Practices

- Used in context of evolving BBP policies, “lessons learned” and “best practices” will help achieve and manage shorter program timelines
- No single list of “exhaustive” lessons learned/ best practices methodologies
- Following slides can serve as good starting point
- No “cookbook” solution...so bring your minds and creativity to maximize benefits



It's All About the Team



- Shortening and managing program timelines is very complex
- Requires “up-front and early” participation from entire team
 - Continues throughout acquisition life-cycle
- Imperative to include all functions so Team is “on the same page”
- Everyone is required to maximize potential benefit



Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAG)

The screenshot shows the DAU website interface. At the top, there's a navigation bar with 'Home', 'Contact Us', 'Tutorial', and 'Downloads'. Below this is a 'Document View' section with a circular diagram. To the right is a 'Lifecycle Framework View' diagram. Below these are three main content areas: 'Browse Content by Topic Tag' with a list of chapters, 'Defense Acquisition Policy News' featuring a news article about 'Document Streamlining - Program Protection Plan', and 'AT&T - Acquisition Systems' with a 'DAP QUICK LINKS' section containing icons for various systems like DAP, DAI, ACP, and others.

- Provides non-mandatory guidance on best practices, lessons learned, and expectations
- Guidebook focuses on processes (“how to”)
- Designed for electronic use
- Organized by functional area and acquisition phase
- Built-in links

One of *THE* authoritative sources for programs lessons learned and best practices...take the time to explore it!


<https://dag.dau.mil/Pages/Default.aspx>

Purpose: Addresses the DAG – one of the main acquisition documents that are repository for acquisition lessons learned and best practices.



Integrated Lifecycle Framework

Continual Evolution Reflecting Program Guidance



<https://ilc.dau.mil/>

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
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Purpose: This slide shows the continuing evolution of the Integrated Lifecycle Framework. By definition, this framework is a compilation of “lessons learned” and “best practices” that have been accumulated over time and, then, integrated into subsequent versions of the framework.



Evolutionary Acquisition


- Two strategy approaches to full capability: *evolutionary* and *single-step*
 - Particular approach chosen depends on:
 - Technology maturity
 - Availability of time-phased capabilities
 - Cost of fielding multiple configurations
 - Cost/benefit of incremental vs single-step
- Acquisition Strategy shall address chosen approach
- Evolutionary acquisition is the preferred strategy for rapid acquisition of mature technology
- “Militarily Useful” 80% solution = quicker to the Warfighter at less cost and time



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<http://www.defense.gov/qdr/QDR%20as%20of%2026JAN10%200700.pdf>

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
41

- One of “major problems”
 - “...requirements for new systems are too often set at the far limit of current technological boundaries.”
 - Too often result is reduced technical performance followed by chronic cost and schedule overruns
- Reform to overcome
 - Early and clear definition of approved requirements based on rigorous analysis of alternatives

Purpose: Introduces the topic of requirements and how program timelines are continually impacted by unclear and/or immature requirements. This is a major focus for any program – especially early in acquisition lifecycle. This slide shows the level of attention that “requirements” has gained within DoD.



Requirements Creep




Fight the Urge!

- **Significant additions or modifications throughout the lifecycle**
 - Results in extensions to and alteration of system's functionality and scope
- **Nature of acquisition process – over years – will result in changes to the program**
 - New requirements levied onto program
 - Changes better defined as “creep”
- **Regular dialogue between PM and Requirements Manager**
- **Training available:**
<https://acc.dau.mil/requirements>



Integrated Master Plan (IMP) / Integrated Master Schedule (IMS)



- Provide systematic approach to program planning, scheduling, and execution
- Not a one-time event or only to satisfy reviews
- Consider non-advocate reviews
 - All of the stakeholders (including oversight team) and functional areas
 - Non-attribution setting
- Develop validated schedule with vertical and horizontal buy-in
- Verified with help of Integrated Baseline Review (IBR)

https://acc.dau.mil/adl/en-US/19559/file/54798/IMP_IMS_Guide_v9.pdf

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
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Purpose: To illustrate that IMS/IMP (and associated IBR) are critical to maintaining a program's schedule. The IMS/IMP need to be well-thought out and, with assistance of IBR, constructed with as many risks and as much reality included as possible. Verification of IMS/IMP is ongoing process.



Laying a Solid “Team” Foundation



Acquisition Program Transition Workshop (APTW)

- “...encourage maximum use...”
 - Recommended for all ACAT I programs
- **Purpose: achieve early alignment of government and industry teams**
 - Particularly at IPT level
- **Held within first month of contract award or re-baseline action**
- **Agreement on roadmaps and near-term planning events**
 - Set up schedule ground-rules and discuss how might buy-back time

<https://acc.dau.mil/ad/en-US/441072/file/56941/20110401-%20APTW%20-%20ATL.pdf>

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Purpose: Introduce Acquisition Program Transition Workshop (APTW) as means to solidify “team” foundation. These types of workshops can be mix of “hard skills” (i.e, specific documents/processes) to maintain a program’s timelines) and “soft skills” (intangibles associated with reaching maximum team effectiveness and proficiency.



APTW Benefits

- **Shared perspectives on program goals, business processes and intended outcomes**
 - PMs jointly expressing goals/objectives for both team & program level
- **Positive environment of trust, collaboration, teamwork and openness**
 - IPT charter/meeting rules and content/responsibilities
- **Solid plan for moving forward at IPT Level**
 - IPTs' understanding accountability and responsibility
- **Improved Expectations for Program Execution**
 - Joint team review of detailed schedules and understanding of deliverables
- **Sharing of best practices**
 - Joint use of best practices to improve performance is key to teamwork
- **Data Driven Program Management**
 - Team/program metrics identified for weekly/monthly reviews



Nominal APTW Schedule

Event	Briefer	Event	Briefer	Event	Briefer	
<i>Different for every Program</i>		0730-0745 Recap	PMs/DAU	0730-0745 Recap	PMs/DAU	
		0745-0830 User Viewpoint/ Reporting Requirements	Users	0745-1130 IPT Working Sessions	IPT Leads	
		0830-0915 Program Startup (IBR) Overview	DAU Cont./Gov.	1130-1200 Working Lunch		
		0915-0930 Break		1200-1500 IPT Status – Charter Update – Responsibility – Accountability – Risk Register – IBR Planning – IMP/IMS Issues – Comms Plan – Near-Term Deliveries – GFE Review	IPT Leads (Co-Brief) Facilitator (Moderator)	
		0930-1130 Contract Baseline, Incentives, & Change Management	DAU Cont./Gov.			
		1130-1200 Working Lunch				
		1200-1245 Program Metrics/ Best Practices	DAU Contractor Government			
		1245-1345 Risk & Opportunity Mgmt / IMP / IMS	DAU Cont./Gov.			
	1400-1415 Workshop Overview	DAU	1345-1415 Communication / Metrics/ Reviews	DAU Cont./Gov.		
	1415-1430 Introductions	Govt./Cont. Executives	1415-1430 Break			
1430-1515 Program Strengths/ Barriers to Success	DAU	1430-1730 IPT Working Sessions	IPT Leads	1500-1630 PM Review – Path to IBR – Action Items – Team Challenges	PMs Facilitator (Moderator)	
1515-1630 PM Values & Vision	PMs	1730-2030 Dinner & Social				

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Purpose: This schedule is nominal only and can be tailored to specific customer requirements/needs.



Agenda

- *Why Care?*
- *Better Buying Power (BBP) Initiative*
- *Applicable BBPi Policies*
- *Lessons Learned / Best Practices*
- **References**
- *Summary*



References

- **Better Buying Power – Public Site**
 - <https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=432727&lang=en-US>
- **BBP Policies, Memos & Guides**
 - <https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=432900>
- **Acquisition Community Connection (ACC)**
 - <https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx>
- **Mission Assistance**
- **Defense Acquisition Guidebook**
 - <https://dag.dau.mil/Pages/Default.aspx>
 - <http://www.dau.mil/default.aspx> (link within DAU Top 5 box)
- **Integrated Lifecycle Framework**
 - <https://ilc.dau.mil/>
- **DAWIA Certification Training**
 - <http://icatalog.dau.mil/onlinecatalog/tabnav.aspx>
- **DAU Continuous Learning Modules**
 - <http://icatalog.dau.mil/onlinecatalog/tabnavcl.aspx>
- **DAU Targeted Training**
 - http://icatalog.dau.mil/onlinecatalog/targeted_training.aspx

Purpose: Illustrative list of some references available to a customer to gain further acquisition knowledge that will help with development of shortening program timelines.



Agenda

- *Why Care?*
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- *References*
- **Summary**



Summary

- **Expectation is for programs to actively and aggressively look at ways to shorten program timelines**
- **No specific amplifying BBP memorandums regarding this “thrust area”...but it is addressed within other policy documents**
- **Use BBP policy in conjunction with acquisition-related lessons learned and best practices**

An Opportunity to Use Your Mind and Be Creative